


JUNE 2019

AFTER ACTION REVIEW
**TROPICAL CYCLONE
IDAI RESPONSE**





Cover image: Dorinda Antonio and her son Manuel Lazalo arrive by boat in Beira from Buzi District, Mozambique. Buzi was one of the areas worst affected by Cyclone Idai. UNICEF/James Oatway.

Inside cover image: CashCap Expert Ricardo Lobo with villagers in Dondo, Mozambique. NORCAP/Ida Sem Fossvik.

“The Standby support has been incredible. The speed with which you have identified the right people, the speed with which they have been deployed, it was a real saving grace for us.”

- Deputy Representative, UNICEF Mozambique



THE STANDBY PARTNERSHIP

The SBP is a network of bilateral agreements between a range of partners that provide support via the deployment of gratis personnel to fourteen United Nations (UN) agencies. The partnership emerged in response to the increasing prevalence of global humanitarian crises, which required the UN to rapidly expand its human resource capability at short notice. The collaboration between UN agencies and deploying partner agencies is now an integral component of any rapid response.




THE FOLLOWING SBP AGENCIES LED THIS AFTER ACTION REVIEW:



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PATH OF TROPICAL CYCLONE IDAI



1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY



The aftermath of Tropical Cyclone Idai in Beira, Mozambique. UNICEF/Karel Prinsloo.

In March and April 2019, Southern Africa was hit by two cyclones, Idai and Kenneth, which left a trail of destruction in their path. Close to 2.2 million people were in need of urgent assistance in Mozambique alone. Following the humanitarian response, a number of members of the Standby Partnership (SBP) agreed to conduct a joint After Action Review (AAR) focused primarily on Mozambique. The purpose of the mission was to assess the overall responsiveness and impact of the entire SBP response on behalf of all agencies and partners. It was then envisaged that this work could serve as recent evidence to pinpoint weaknesses in the current system and improve the mechanism going forward. A summary of key findings and recommendations from this AAR can be found on pages five and six of this report.

The review found that SBP support to UN agencies responding to Tropical Cyclone (TC) Idai was timely, extensive in its reach and critical in nature. In many cases, UN agencies acknowledged they would not have been able to manage aspects of their operations or deliver particular emergency programmes without Standby support. Countless examples came to light during interviews of SBP deployees filling critical roles, most notably in emergency coordination. SBP deployees were also on the ground within a relatively short timeframe compared to other surge mechanisms and were in place for significantly longer (SBP deployments averaged three to six months, compared to two to six weeks for other surge).

Review participants routinely commented on **“the particular mix of skills, experience and mindset”** that deployees brought to the response. On the whole, **the SBP mechanism provided the right people at the right time** – people with a critical mix of technical skills, emergency experience, relevant language skills, and interpersonal and cultural competencies – *who were available to rapidly deploy*. The review identified three key areas in which the value of SBP support is particularly compelling:

A. Rapid scale up – all of the UN agencies consulted lacked sufficient emergency personnel to enable them to scale up to remotely appropriate levels. Whilst a small number of agencies were already working on drought response in Mozambique and could divert staff, UN internal surge was not sufficient for agencies to scale up. UN agencies lacked Emergency Coordinators, Cluster Coordinators, Information Managers and Humanitarian Affairs Officers in particular – critical roles to the overall management of the response. UNFPA for example had one part-time emergency coordinator in place and was not intending to continue supporting that role prior to the cyclone. UNOCHA did not have a presence in Mozambique and UNICEF was present in Maputo only.

B. Language skills – there was a clear lack of Portuguese speakers available to deploy via UN agencies’ existing surge capacity mechanisms. The Standby Partnership offered rapid access to experienced emergency personnel with Portuguese language skills. However, the number of available Portuguese speakers with the relevant technical expertise available through the SBP was exhausted quickly. This constrained the effectiveness of the overall response in the early days. As the emergency entered its second phase, Spanish and Italian speakers were accepted where Portuguese speakers were not available. There were also examples of SBP deployees originating from neighbouring countries (i.e: Zimbabwe, Malawi) who were proficient in local languages of Mozambique. In addition to their technical skills, these deployees filled critical communications gaps and were readily accepted by the affected local communities. In relation to language capability, the review identified a need for the SBP to prioritise recruitment of roster members with Portuguese (and other) language skills.

C. Specific technical expertise that was otherwise not available. The Standby Partnership filled critical gaps in profiles such as Education in Emergencies, Information Management and Cluster Coordination. The SBP further enhanced the *quality of humanitarian action* through the provision of experts working on cross-cutting issues such as Inclusion (Disability & Gender) and Protection Mainstreaming. Furthermore, the SBP through interagency support from CashCap¹ and the Protection Standby Capacity Project’s (ProCap)² was instrumental in providing critical expertise to ensure the centrality of Cash Assistance, Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA) and Protection in the response. These examples illustrate the way in which the SBP responds quickly to emerging needs and priority areas, where UN staffing and other internal surge is overstretched.

¹ CashCap is the NORCAP Cash and Markets Capacity Development Project. It deploys specialists to increase the use and effectiveness of cash and markets programming in humanitarian aid.

² The Protection Standby Capacity Project (ProCap) is an inter-agency initiative created in 2005 in collaboration with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and NORCAP, which seeks to build global protection capacity and enhance the humanitarian system’s protection response. ProCap aims to strengthen the collaborative response of protection and non-protection mandated organisations and supports the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Principals’ Statement on the Centrality of Protection in Humanitarian Action.

AT A GLANCE: SBP SUPPORT TO TROPICAL CYCLONE IDAI IN MOZAMBIQUE, ZIMBABWE AND MALAWI*

98

DEPLOYMENTS
(71 MALES & 27 FEMALES)

15

SBP DEPLOYING
AGENCIES


12

SBP RECEIVING
AGENCIES


SBP SUPPORT TO TC IDAI
IS ESTIMATED TO BE
VALUED IN EXCESS OF

US\$3M*

DEPLOYMENTS BY RECEIVING AGENCY




DEPLOYMENTS BY SBP DEPLOYING AGENCY



*Based on available partner data for the period March to July 2019.


*The Standby Partnership continues to deploy/extend deployments, so these figures will rise.

DEPLOYMENTS BY COUNTRY





DISTRIBUTION OF DEPLOYEES IN MOZAMBIQUE


Please refer to map of Mozambique on page 8




DEPLOYMENTS BY CLUSTER/SECTOR



DEPLOYMENTS BY CROSS-CUTTING AREA



DEPLOYEES' GENERAL AREA OF EXPERTISE



1.1 KEY FINDINGS

1

RAPID SCALE UP

SBP deployees were selected, briefed and on the ground quickly. Minimal delays were reported by host agencies and deployees, which enabled the UN to rapidly scale up their operations during the first phase of the response.

2

REACH

SBP support was instrumental in enabling UN agencies to extend their operations into areas of Mozambique that were not being reached. SBP deployees were also critical in *mapping the response* – they extensively documented both geographic and operational gaps, and mapped the wide range of partners working on the response. This enabled the UN to quickly target gaps and expand into hard-to-reach areas.

3

CRITICALITY

Support offered via the SBP was critical to the UN response in Mozambique. In many cases, UN agency representatives acknowledged they would not have been able to manage aspects of their operations without Standby support. SBP deployees filled crucial coordination positions and in some cases led entire emergency programmes (where that capacity was not already available in the country – for example, Education in Emergencies).

4

LONGEVITY

SBP deployees were in place for significantly longer than all other internal surge (average of 3-6 months for Standby compared to 2-6 weeks for other surge). This level of continuity was consistently cited as a key point of difference for the SBP and contributed to the overall effectiveness of the response.

5

TECHNICAL SKILLS

The SBP provided rapid emergency expertise that was otherwise not available to or within UN agencies or available for local hire. SBP deployees provided a broad range of technical profiles, as well as emerging and cross-cutting skill profiles that are more difficult to fill (i.e.: Disability Inclusion, PSEA, Cash Assistance).

6

LANGUAGE SKILLS

The SBP offered UN agencies rapid access to experienced emergency personnel with Portuguese language skills that were not available via internal or other surge. This was notable given that recent emergencies (Venezuela, Angola) had already spiked demand for Latin-based language speakers. Some UN agencies, however, reported difficulty sourcing SBP candidates with technical skills and Portuguese, particularly in the second phase of the response.

7

LEADERSHIP AND 'SOFT SKILLS'

This aspect is one of the most critical factors in the success or otherwise of SBP deployments. It was not uncommon for review informants to give more weight to the interpersonal attributes of SBP deployees than to technical and language skills. Deployees were variously described as good leaders and self-starters, operating with empathy, humility and commitment. This facilitated their acceptance by other response actors and in many cases members of the affected communities.

8

IMPACT

The complementary nature of SBP support clearly bolstered UN operations on the ground, whereby existing staff capacity (local knowledge, development expertise, depth) merged with emergency response capacity (coordination, specific technical profiles, speed). As a result, interview respondents felt that SBP support contributed to a quicker, more coordinated response and more inclusive programming.

9

SUSTAINABILITY

Sustainable outcomes were not a prominent feature of the majority of SBP positions – this is not uncommon for humanitarian surge and largely depended on whether the agency deemed the role as an ongoing requirement. However, specific examples did emerge of agencies taking significant steps to ensure the sustainability of deployees' work in preparation for their departure and in future planning for ongoing positions. On the whole, review participants generally acknowledged that sustainability should be better factored into all aspects of emergency surge going forward.

10

BOTTLENECKS TO UN SCALE UP

The volume of emergency surge, Standby deployments and urgent recruitments put significant strain on UN country office HR departments (which had limited access to any form of 'emergency HR surge'). This caused bottlenecks with regard to getting people on the ground and inducted quickly.

1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

1

CRITICALITY OF LANGUAGE CAPABILITIES

Requesting agencies should consider in more detail and better specify how critical language skills are to the role. Ensure this is adequately conveyed in the Terms of Reference for the requested SBP deployment. Further, the wider SBP Network should prioritise the recruitment of roster members with Portuguese (and other) language capabilities – and actively seek out highly experienced local responders as part of this effort.

2

PRIORITISE SBP COORDINATION AT RESPONSE ONSET

During the critical first days of an emergency, the SBP Network should endeavour to convene a Webex or similar coordination call to discuss available personnel versus requesting UN agencies' surge needs. This would assist as a sort of prioritisation exercise and may reduce the element of competition between requesting agencies, and see deployees placed on the basis of critical need (seeking to ensure, in particular, that those with language skills in short supply are spread appropriately).

3

CONSIDER PRE-DEPARTURE CONTACT MANDATORY (BETWEEN DEPLOYEE AND UN COUNTRY OFFICE)

Pre-departure contact (e.g. Skype call) between the person deploying and the country office should be considered mandatory. The review found that contact prior to arrival sets expectations and flags any inconsistencies in understanding of the deployment for both parties. There were instances in Mozambique where this contact did not occur, resulting in misunderstandings and missing critical information.

4

DEPLOY GENERALIST COORDINATION PROFILES IN CRITICAL FIRST DAYS

SBP deploying organisations and UN receiving agencies should prioritise deploying generalist coordination profiles (e.g. Humanitarian Affairs Officers or similar) to UN country offices in the critical first days of an emergency. If built into their TOR, these people would be well placed to assist with incoming surge coordination and mitigate difficulties in getting deployees on the ground and oriented quickly.

5

ENSURE DEPLOYEES RECEIVE A FULL SECURITY BRIEFING

Deploying organisations and receiving UN agencies should reaffirm their commitment to deployees receiving a full and meaningful security briefing immediately on arrival. Deployees should also be pro-active in this regard and ensure they are receiving regular updates from UNDSS. Multiple deployees in Mozambique stated that they had not received a UNDSS (or agency) security briefing at the time of the review.

6

GIVE EQUAL WEIGHT TO SOFT SKILLS AND TECHNICAL SKILLS – SOFT SKILLS ARE AN ESSENTIAL ENABLER

Interpersonal competencies or 'soft skills' are arguably the critical factor in the success or otherwise of surge deployments. The SBP could find ways to acknowledge this and give greater emphasis to identifying and/or documenting soft skills in recruitment and selection for deployment. Online modules or similar could also be developed to support deployees in this regard.

7

ENHANCE FEEDBACK FROM UN TRAININGS

This AAR highlighted the importance of both technical and soft skills. Many SBP deployees undertake UN trainings (with support via the SBP Training Secretariat). Given that soft skills are easily observed in an interactive training setting, SBP deploying and receiving agencies could find ways to enhance feedback channels related to roster member/employee performance during UN trainings to inform deployment nominations.

8

DUTY OF CARE ABOVE ALL ELSE

Receiving UN agencies and deploying organisations should remain cognisant of the primacy of duty of care for deployees. The strengths that became evident through this AAR – the flexibility and commitment of deployees, the longer length of deployment compared to other surge, a willingness to live in remote areas – can push deployees to their limits, leading to burnout or other issues. These positive aspects of SBP support should continue to be secondary to overall duty of care.

9

RECRUIT A CENTRAL SBP COORDINATION FOCAL POINT

The AAR review team faced significant challenges in collating and corroborating data to inform this mission. A central coordination or information management function would assist the overall SBP response to be more effective by collecting information at the response outset, identifying gaps or duplication, and informing after action activities.

10

COMMIT TO TAKING SBP AAR LESSONS LEARNED FORWARD

This AAR has identified that SBP support was critical to UN operations in Mozambique. By virtue of this, it also highlights the significant challenges facing the UN system in resourcing humanitarian crises in 2019. Some of the lessons learned from this AAR exercise are unique to this particular context, others are longer-standing issues that require action on the part of both deploying and receiving agencies. With regard to the overall impact of SBP support, issues pertaining to sustainability and localisation in particular warrant further discussion.

2. INTRODUCTION



Mariamo (29) with her newborn baby, just a few hours old, in a temporary health facility in Mutua, outside Beira, Mozambique. NORCAP/Oda Lykke Mortensen.

TC Idai made landfall during the night of 14 and 15 March, 2019 near the city of Beira, Sofala Province, in central Mozambique. The cyclone brought torrential rains and winds to Sofala, Zambezia, Manica and Inhambane provinces. The UN and humanitarian partners in Mozambique appealed for US\$40.8 million to provide critical emergency relief to 400,000 people affected by Idai. On 25 April, TC Kenneth made landfall in northern Mozambique between the districts of Macomia and Mocimboa da Praia in Cabo Delgado province. With wind gusts of up to 220km/h, Kenneth became the strongest cyclone to ever hit the African continent, leaving an additional 374,000 people in need.

MOZAMBIQUE



Whilst not wholly standardised, Standby arrangements are similar across requesting UN agencies and deploying organisations. The challenges, lessons learned and opportunities identified in reviews of the SBP mechanism are therefore often the same across the network. The SBP has determined that where the activities and objectives of SBP partners align for a particular humanitarian response, joint field monitoring missions may add value for both individual agencies and the broader partnership. Perhaps most critically, joint SBP missions minimise the burden on country offices who would otherwise be called upon to host or support multiple concurrent missions by individual SBPs.

Following the humanitarian response to Idai, a range of SBPs agreed to conduct a joint mission focused on Mozambique. Individual agencies and SBP deploying organisations conducted separate monitoring in other affected countries, namely Malawi & Zimbabwe. Where appropriate the review incorporates learning from the response to TC Kenneth as both responses were integrated. This review builds on a similar mission that took place in Sudan and Kenya in late 2008, undertaken by NORCAP, SRSA (now renamed MSB), UNHCR and UNICEF. A second mission took place in 2010 to the Occupied Palestinian Territory

(OPT) and Yemen carried out by MSB, NORCAP, Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), OCHA (OPT only), UNHCR (Yemen only), and UNICEF. In 2012, Kenya and South Sudan were selected jointly by the UN and the SBP deploying organisations as sites for a third field mission, since both countries benefited from significant SBP assistance throughout 2011 and 2012.

The 2019 review team is pleased to present this report, which outlines the key findings and recommendations that resulted from this fourth joint mission. While the review's primary focus was SBP support to the response in Mozambique, the team have referenced examples from follow-on consultations in Zimbabwe and Malawi where there is significant value in doing so.

The number of agencies, deploying organisations and individuals willing to engage in review consultations is indicative of the strong commitment among humanitarian actors to better understand the SBP. This report reflects the views of a diverse range of informants and ultimately recommends that the findings and recommendations are addressed at the partnership level over the coming year.

The SBP AAR review team would like to thank those who took time to be part of this review for their time, experience and perspectives.

“The value of the Standby Partnership has been central and pivotal, given the stretched funding and constraints; gap filling in a high profile way.”

- Head of Office, UNOCHA Mozambique

3.

PURPOSE OF THE AFTER ACTION REVIEW



Members of the affected community and the SBP AAR review team at a resettlement area in Dondo, near Beira, Mozambique.

With an opportunity to learn from the Mozambican experience, a decision to conduct a fourth AAR was agreed amongst a number of SBP organisations and the SBP Steering Committee in June 2019.

An AAR working group was established to determine a Terms of Reference (ToR) for the review team to explore best practices and lessons learned from the first three months of the TC Idai response. It also took the subsequent response to TC Kenneth into consideration. Representatives from UK Department for International Development (DFID), Irish Aid, NORCAP, RedR Australia, and UNICEF participated directly in the mission. They were, however, mandated to carry out the review on behalf of the broader SBP network. Wider TC Idai AAR participation included CANADEM, DRC, FAO, UNFPA, UNOCHA, WHO & WFP. UNICEF supported the mission by providing in-country logistical assistance and access to key personnel in Mozambique. UN agencies that were not able to participate in the field component supported via their country offices where possible.

This joint AAR sought to identify the extent to which the SBP enhanced the capacity of UN operations in Mozambique and to determine how the response mechanism could be improved. The review had two key areas of focus: **operational aspects of the SBP response;** and the **impact and sustainability of SBP deployments.** Challenges and opportunities facing the SBP organisations in their response efforts are often the same and many of the lessons learned will apply to all organisations, whether UN agencies, donors or deploying organisations.



Macomia District, Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique, in April 2019. OCHA/Saviano Abreu.

4. METHODOLOGY



Structural Engineer Paul de Launay, supported by the Australia Assists Program and deployed through RedR Australia, with head staff at a school on the outskirts of Lilongwe, Malawi, where he completed a post-disaster assessment of school infrastructure affected by Cyclone Idai, RedR Australia/Kylie Harrington.

This review took place in Maputo, Beira and Dondo, Mozambique and draws primarily on interviews with those involved in the surge capacity mechanisms that have supported the response to TC Idai.

The joint field monitoring mission included meetings with key stakeholders in Mozambique, including donors, UN country representatives, operational and administrative staff, section chiefs and SBP deployees in the capital and field offices. Lengthy interviews were undertaken, usually lasting between 60-90 minutes. The key informants for the review were those proposed by the respective SBP deploying organisations and UN agencies involved in the Idai response and HQ-based colleagues. Other informants emerged during the course of the review. A total of 16 deployees were interviewed, including eight male and eight female, from seven different deploying organisations, who were deployed to six different receiving agencies. All key informants (35 in total) are listed in Appendix 2.

AAR Interview Guides were developed to ensure consistency; these are attached as an Annex to this report. For interviews with UN agency Country Representatives or Heads of Office, the full review team participated with a lead interviewer and a lead note-taker identified in advance. In order to maximise the use of available time, the review team conducted interviews with deployees in pairs, again with a lead interviewer and a note-taker. All those who were asked to participate in the review accepted the invitation. The AAR team also undertook a field trip facilitated by UNFPA and UNICEF to the affected areas in Dondo, northwest of Beira, where they met with deployees and affected communities.

The ToR for the mission was developed by the participating delegation and reviewed by all SBPs involved in the AAR Working Group and the SBP Steering Committee prior to the mission. The mission findings, lessons learned and recommendations are consolidated in this report, jointly produced by the review team. The report will be shared with all members of the SBP and review participants. Findings will be presented for reflection and discussion at the SBP Network mid annual consultation in Geneva, scheduled to take place on 16 September 2019.

4.1 LIMITATIONS

Due to the short timeframe in which the mission was conceived it was not possible to arrange meetings with key interlocutors such as the Resident Coordinator in Mozambique, the Humanitarian Country Team, members of the National Disaster Management Agency of Mozambique or other government officials. While the AAR review team managed to meet with one civil society organisation (Plan International), meetings with local community based organisations were not possible. While the AAR team met with affected persons directly at the Dondo resettlement area, they were not in a position to hold focus group discussions or key informant interviews with beneficiaries.

The limited timeframe, both in terms of preparatory work and the timeframe in-country to conduct the consultations and interviews meant that the review team could not meet with all available response personnel. This report is a compilation of the outcomes and findings, attempting only to highlight critical common thematic issues. Drawing on the raw data from the consultations available in the annexes, organisations can individually undertake further analysis of the findings in fulfilment of their own requirements.

UNICEF was instrumental in bringing about the AAR, critical in the provision of logistical and host support, and the only SBP UN agency represented on the review team in Mozambique. The review team were cognisant of potential bias and endeavoured to ensure findings were balanced, reflecting the perspectives of all UN agencies active in the SBP as far as possible.

5. REVIEW FINDINGS



NORCAP gender-based violence specialist, Felicité Molengar, helping a woman register to receive a dignity kit. PNORCAP/Ida Sem Fossvik.

The AAR focused on two components of SBP support in the response to TC Idai: **operational aspects of the SBP**; and **the impact and sustainability of SBP deployments**. This section sets out the key findings in relation to both.

5.1 OPERATIONAL

5.1.1 UN UTILISATION OF OTHER SURGE MECHANISMS

Consultations with key personnel in-country make it clear that where emergency roles were essential to the operational response, UN agencies exhausted all possible options to fill those roles internally³. Some agencies deployed rapid response teams, however, in most instances these emergency response teams were only available for relatively short durations due to other workload priorities or the need to respond to other crises. Working on rotation and the short nature of these surge roles created issues, which will be referenced later in this report. Some UN agencies depended on national staff and sought to extend national staff contracts, shift workload priorities or try to hire local consultants as quickly as possible. For organizations like UNFPA, questions have arisen about the need to develop organisational wide standing teams that are ready to deploy or ready to be drawn upon at short notice. Despite the efforts of UN agencies in-country, due to the scale of the crisis agencies were very quickly cognisant of the need for urgent external support.

It is also noted that as the response covered a large geographical area, this put additional pressure on UN agencies to have a staffing presence in multiple locations. The Chimoio region for example is a very large geographical area, and UN agencies were trying to extend their reach in an area of over 3000 square kilometres in and around the Chimoio hub.

5.1.2 UN PRIOR AWARENESS AND UTILISATION OF THE SBP

The majority of country office personnel consulted in UN agencies had little to no awareness of the SBP prior to the cyclone. UN agencies in Mozambique were largely dependent on their HQ-based SBP focal points pro-actively alerting them to the availability of the mechanism. UNFPA Mozambique, for example, did not know about the Standby Partnership prior to the emergency but were quickly briefed by their HQ focal point. This happened in the first days of the response and, whilst there was some confusion regarding leave policies, financial costs and administrative integration between the different SBP deploying agencies, the actual process of engaging SBP personnel was then relatively smooth.

"We need to get better at understanding what the resource possibilities are for emergencies. We benefited enormously from your support - not just from a financial point of view but for the emergency skills your people bring."

- Child Protection Section, UNICEF Mozambique

³ As at the review date UNFPA managed to deploy staff from other offices and make some emergency hires (16 international and 17 nationals). UNICEF conducted 111 surge deployments and recruitments, including 16 SBP/Rapid Response team (SBP long term cluster deployees). UNICEF secured a number of personnel from internal surge capacities; both standing UNICEF staff emergency response teams (9 deployments) and single surge missions from other offices (58 deployments), as well as emergency recruitments (28 hires) however there were limitations due to number of language speakers in internal rosters with as well as duration that internal staff could be released from other emergencies (internal surge average duration was 34 days, requiring rotation of missions for some roles to achieve coverage). In advance of the cyclone, UNOCHA did not have a presence in-country and as such did not have any national staff or otherwise. OCHA brought in surge staff, alongside significant staffing of its Regional Office for Southern and Eastern Africa (ROSEA) to provide support. OCHA were particularly affected by the current zero growth policy in place, which meant that they were dependent on the continued, ongoing support that the SBP brings.

Some personnel, in particular those who had been based at their agency headquarters for a time, did have an awareness of the SBP. However, there were considerable challenges due to pressures faced by respective country office human resource departments in their efforts to administer all the necessary recruitments. For other organisations such as OCHA, an awareness lay at the regional office level where personnel had interacted with and utilised the mechanism previously.

5.1.3 DID THE SBP DEPLOY THE RIGHT PEOPLE?

It is acknowledged that deployment of the right person to a particular role was very much constrained by the required language skills in this response.

With the benefit of hindsight, many of those consulted noted that as the emergency moved beyond the initial few weeks, the **criticality of Portuguese speakers** became particularly evident. Increasingly, agencies were more willing to accept deployees with other Romance languages such as Spanish or Italian. It was also noted that initially, where a 'blanket approach' was applied in efforts to recruit Portuguese speakers, in reality being able to speak Portuguese was much more critical for some functions than others, particularly coordination. However, for those roles with typically less interaction with external or government actors, the Portuguese requirement was not as crucial and perhaps these roles could have been filled more quickly with non-Portuguese speakers or candidates who spoke the local language. **Requesting agencies should consider in more detail and better specify how critical language skills are to the role as set out in the Terms of Reference they circulate to deploying organisations.**

Questions were also raised as to whether all of those with the appropriate language skills went to one agency (those particularly quick off the mark) over the other agencies. Most agencies consulted were open to the idea of **Webex or coordination calls at the initial phase of an emergency. Such calls would enable SBP deploying organisations discuss available personnel set against the collective surge needs of all SBP requesting UN agencies.** This would ensure deployees are with agencies on the basis of need, ensuring that not all deployees with relevant skills are placed with two agencies (i.e. all Portuguese-speaking deployees in one or two agencies only).

Furthermore, some of the UN agencies and SBP deployees raised **the potential of 'twinning' national officers with SBP deployees who have technical skills but lack the language ability.** This occurred successfully in Beira whereby an SBP deployee (GBV Specialist) worked closely alongside a local Community Mobilisation Officer. Pairing in this way would help to mitigate communications barriers but would also have a capacity building effect and lead to greater sustainability by ensuring continuity of the position being covered once the SBP deployee departs.

"We had no awareness of the SBP."

- HR representative, WFP Mozambique

"It helped that I had been in Geneva. I knew about the Standby Partnership. I knew the resource and we had used it before. We wanted the best people so we were following multiple tracks - surge and Standby. But we should have beefed up our HR much more rapidly, that was a lesson learned."

- Deputy Representative, UNICEF Mozambique

"In the beginning the bar was set too high; we wanted technical and coordination staff with Portuguese. Next send Latin speakers, and then - send anybody!"

- UNFPA representative, Maputo

"Mozambique is one of the most disaster prone countries in the world - the response to Idai should serve as a wakeup call to recruit more Portuguese and Spanish speakers."

- Irish Embassy, Maputo

"She has experience from Africa and speaks Portuguese, which makes her move like a fish."

- UNFPA representative, Beira, on working alongside an SBP deployee

"Very few government officials speak English, they'll always speak Portuguese. It was a challenge for Standby and our internal appointments. It does depend on the role but if you're working on the UNICEF response, you really need Portuguese because government is a key implementing partner."

- Deputy Representative, UNICEF Mozambique

A number of others consulted on the issue of language questioned if there may be **potential to engage Translators Without Borders and other similar organisations with language expertise as a SBP.**

Officials from the Irish Embassy felt that perhaps there has been an overemphasis on recruitment of Arabic and French speakers across many deploying organisations involved in the SBP to date. They noted **the importance of placing an increased focus on recruitment of Spanish and Portuguese speakers**, particularly given the likelihood of increased needs in contexts such as Mozambique, Angola and Venezuela.

Feedback was resoundingly positive regarding deployees' technical skills. For example, of the 18 people that UNICEF deployed to Mozambique, questions only arose around the suitability of two deployees. Neither related to technical ability but rather to language in one instance, and interpersonal skills in another. The SBP deploying organisations invest heavily in terms of recruitment and/or selection processes in order to produce experts with a high level of technical skills match to the needs of UN agencies. In addition, a significant number of deployees have previous experience either with the UN agency or as a Standby deployee to another agency. Due to the nature of roster-based employment, SBP deployees frequently bring expertise and experience from multiple other emergencies or agencies, creating a fast and effective transfer of knowledge and good practices between emergencies. The cohort of SBP deployees in Mozambique were culturally diverse and brought a range of contextual and language skills (Portuguese and local languages) that facilitated their acceptance in communities.

All UN agencies consulted during the course of the review were asked to comment on the suitability of candidates nominated in response to their requests, on the suitability of persons actually deployed and how deployees met the role specifications as set out in the request Terms of Reference. It is important to note observations were sought on suitability of deployees in general and not on the specific performance of individuals. Here again, it was apparent that the language question was a constraining factor. Across the board the response from all UN agencies consulted was positive, however, a number of key issues were raised for consideration going forward;

– **Limited number of CVs being presented for selection.** A number of agencies (e.g. UNFPA, OCHA) cited the lack of available candidates being nominated as particularly problematic in accessing suitable surge capacity through the SBP in this response. UNFPA noted that for some requests they only had one or two candidates to choose from. Out of the eight requests made by UNOCHA, three remained unfilled due to lack of suitable CVs. They

struggled to find deployees with both the directly relevant skillset and suitable language skills. In the case of OCHA, Humanitarian Affairs Officers (HAOs) and Information Management Officers (IMOs) are expected to work closely with the government, thus requiring a high level of Portuguese fluency.

- **Candidates’ actual experience not matching what was presented in their CVs.** Some agencies noted that while candidates were performing to the best of their ability in their roles, in certain instances what was set out in their CV was not commensurate with their actual ability and that they did not necessarily live up to expectations. OCHA also noted that there was a need on their part to apply particular rigour to ensure that they do not end up with deployees who are not capable of fulfilling their roles.

Humility, cultural sensitivity and interpersonal skills as a priority. Numerous agencies consistently raised deployees’ interpersonal and cross-cultural competencies – citing their ability to engage positively with colleagues, build and maintain working relationships, and maintain composure under pressure. The value of possessing these specific traits was also corroborated by a number of deployees that were interviewed. The ability to build positive working relationships with local government officials and national staff was consistently raised as a necessary attribute. It was also noted by interview participants that it is not possible to get a measure of this from a CV and still difficult to get a sense from a brief telephone conversation prior to deployment, if that takes place.

In this sense **there is an onus on SBP deploying organisations to ensure they are confident in the interpersonal competencies of the personnel they deploy.** A number of UN agencies emphasised the importance of being aware of both positive and negative feedback from previous deployments before accepting deployees for a second deployment, and the importance of there being a willingness on the part of deploying organisations to de-roster personnel where the feedback has not been fairly consistently positive.

The value of coordination, leadership and ‘self-starter’ competencies: In addition to finding candidates with the required technical and language skills, UN agencies consistently emphasised the value of deployees’ possessing coordination, leadership and ‘self-starter’ competencies. All UN agencies cited a preference for specific previous experience with their respective agencies. It was apparent that there is a **propensity on the part of UN agencies to seek and choose candidates with previous experience working in their agency (and/or having undertaken agency trainings).** UN representatives generally felt that this ensured deployees could ‘hit the ground running’.

“The specific value of Standby Partners is so personality driven. We are guests here in this country, there are standards, there are customs, you need to be polite, introduce yourself, know what questions you can and can’t ask. The Standbys that I see here seem to know that. They demonstrate extreme flexibility and agility. There is an intangible ‘values’ element to all of this.”

– SBP Deployee

“It’s hard to define but I would say it’s a kind of workplace empathy. Not flying off the handle. I’ve had people say you need to punish and humiliate people but I tend not to do that. If you do that, maybe you’ll get a reaction and they’ll do what you just asked for, but you’ll lose that partner. That’s what I’m proud of personally. And there’s a lot of biting my tongue but it works in the long run. You tend to know if someone is going to snap at some point so you know when not to push it. You don’t really have any negotiation or leverage but you use the doors that you can.”

– SBP Deployee

"The technical skills were ok, it was the interpersonal skills – the ability to lead, manage up, manage government, and be a senior operative. Technical skills such as logistics, GBV, SRH were not lacking – higher level coordination was missing. We needed self-starters. Surge people need to have the capacity for organisation and management. Leadership and team skills are far more important."

**- Country Representative, UNFPA
Mozambique**

"It's not just the knowledge they bring. It was amazing to see how they come in and just get going. We're mostly development people here – we talk, we consult, but these people get in and get everything moving fast."

**- Chief of Child Protection, UNICEF
Mozambique**

"On whether Standby deployees need that 'leadership function', I would question what was in the ToR in the first place. If you ask for a Technical Education Specialist at P3 level then that is what you get. The country office should ask for what they need. As a Standby Partner or a consultant you can't fill core functions like signing off, managing funds, and supervising staff. I think this is a benefit to Standby deployees – they can focus on their technical expertise and not get dragged into admin."

- Head of Office, UNICEF Beira

There was also a sense that **UN agencies could be more prescriptive in terms of what they specify in the ToRs** they circulate, which were often exceedingly generic. While there is an expectation that deployees will be flexible with regard to the ToR, requesting UN agencies could be more cognisant that there may be a tendency to "ask deployees to double hat - we always ask them to do more than they were initially selected for" (Head of Office, UNICEF Beira). **It could be argued that an agency is unlikely to find multiple candidates at P3 level with appropriate technical skills, Portuguese fluency, leadership skills, an ability to coordinate with both empathy and humility – who is immediately available to deploy.**

5.1.4 DID THE SBP DEPLOY IN TIME?

On the whole, the review found that SBP deployees (where available) were on the ground quickly. No extraordinary delays in terms of administration of SBP contracts or deployment procedures were noted by UN agencies once a candidate had been selected. A number of HR representatives consulted during the course of the review did reference significant challenges in expediting the large number of recruitments needed during the course of the emergency, particularly at the initial phase. HR colleagues at the country office level were faced with processing internal UN surge mechanisms, recruiting locally hired staff and consultants, as well as dealing with sometimes unfamiliar SBP recruitment procedures. As referenced in the previous SBP awareness section, the majority of HR representatives consulted stated that they had little to no awareness of the SBP prior to the cyclone.

The volume of rapid recruitments posed the most significant challenge for UN agencies and presented as the most significant bottleneck from a country office perspective in terms of getting deployees on the ground and well inducted. A number of UN agency country offices enquired whether it would be **possible to request 'HR surge' through the SBP**, since the HR function is a critical administrative enabler during a response.

The review team notes that individual UN agencies have specific HR practices and SBP deployees would not be familiar with these nor have the authority to sign-off administrative and on-boarding processes. Nonetheless, Humanitarian Affairs Officers or similar profiles could be deployed via the SBP to support existing HR capacity during a response.

Going forward, further consideration could be given to how UN agencies (particularly HR sections) and SBPs might frontload administrative processes that can facilitate rapid deployment. For instance, after TC Kenneth hit the Comoros Islands, there were a number of days before it then hit mainland Mozambique. This

allowed country offices and SBPs time to consult and frontload recruitment requirements in advance of the cyclone hitting. Some agencies also felt that they could have started requesting roles in the days before Cyclone Idai hit – particularly for essential early roles (e.g. HAO/IMO). It was also noted that some SBP agencies have previously engaged in circulating general **“get ready” calls** to SBP deploying organisations in advance of an imminent emergency hitting. These calls can allow deployees and deploying organisations critical time to ready themselves before more specific details and requirements are available.

Generally, TC Idai deployees were sent in two waves; the first wave within the initial week or two of the cyclone and the second wave up to a month later. The question of timeliness can be viewed from both the demand side (UN agencies) and supply side (SBP deploying organisations). SBP focal points in UN HQs are critical interlocutors in ensuring that; affected country offices are aware of the SBP, can utilise the partnership, that detailed and specific requests are circulated, and appropriate candidates nominated as quickly as possible. They are also critical in terms of ensuring the deployees are on the ground fast whilst balancing duty of care to deployees.

The review determined;

- By and large, UN agency SBP focal points were proactive in reaching out to country offices to make them aware of the SBP and to inform them of the availability of SBP personnel.
- Moderate delays did occur with some deployees. In hindsight, UN agencies may have been more likely to immediately recruit candidates put forward without Portuguese if there had been a greater awareness of the general lack of Portuguese speakers available, and if there had been a greater degree of nuance in determining how critical the language requirement was to every role.
- Generally, recruitment happened very quickly, on average country offices noted that it took 10-12 days for requests to go to their respective HQs, to SBP deploying organisations and for the COs to start receiving nominations. OCHA noted some significant challenges in terms of receiving suitable candidates to choose from.
- In other responses, requests to fill positions in sectors like Education often do not come in first wave. However, it was noted that in response to Idai requests for SBP deployees were made early on which had very positive flow-on effects. The TC Idai response in general benefitted from having areas such as Education supported early on.

“We noticed that we had an expected arrival date and in most cases the actual arrival was one week later. There were various reasons behind each one so no common reason for the delay, but it would be good to know that in the beginning so that we can align everything. Having said that, they still came very quickly.”

- Chief of WASH, UNICEF Mozambique

“SBP deployees were in place within two weeks of the cyclone – we were happy with this timescale.”

- Head of Office, OCHA Mozambique

“It was two or three weeks... from the day we submitted the form until the day we got the person. Within the first month we started requesting the next wave.”

- Country Representative, WFP Mozambique

5.1.5 DID UN AGENCIES IN MOZAMBIQUE:

5.1.5.1 *Provide adequate introduction and orientation to employees?*

The level of appreciation of SBP deployees as an in-kind contribution was reflected in the extent to which receiving agencies facilitated deployees to hit the ground running. For example, the review team heard examples from deployees of Chiefs of Section prioritising briefing deployees immediately on arrival over other work pressures. **On the whole, the review team found that UN agencies were effective in in preparing for deployees' arrival – they knew deployees were coming and they were prepared to receive them.**

Some difficulties were noted by a number of deployees, although these were in the minority. Where issues did arise the review team found that they generally related to delays in setting up email addresses, lack of ID or swipe cards, and lack of operational equipment such as laptops and required software.

As a matter of good practice, deployees should be supported by the deploying agency to be in contact with the Country Office prior to departure (generally a Skype call). It is recommended that they speak directly with their line manager during that call.

5.1.5.2 *Provide deployees with a full security briefing?*

Consultations with deployees raised concerns about the extent to which they had received adequate security briefings. There is room for improvement in this area. It would seem in many cases the onus was on the deployee to ensure that they attended a security briefing at the beginning of their deployment. Concerns in relation to adequate security briefings were two-fold;

1. Some deployees did not receive a full security briefing. In particular, those travelling to Beira and other field locations who didn't spend much time in Maputo were more likely to not have received a security briefing.
2. Some deployees that did receive a security briefing felt that it was too general and should focus more on specific threats.

There was a sense that following TC Idai, security briefings may have been overlooked or may not have been prioritized because of the onset of TC Kenneth. The review team determined that whether or not the briefings were too general, the importance of attending the security briefing cannot be understated. It keeps deployees "plugged in" with updates from UNDSS and ensures that deployees get alerts in real time.

The review team recommends that deploying organisations reiterate the importance of receiving a full and meaningful security briefing and that deployees ensure that they are receiving regular updates from UNDSS. In addition to concerns for the wellbeing of the deployee, questions related to insurance cover may arise if something were to happen and the deployee has not received a briefing and is not connected with UNDSS. It is also recommended that receiving UN agency country offices renew their commitment to ensure deployees receive a full and meaningful security briefing. It was also noted that deployees will not receive TRIP Alerts if they don't engage with UNDSS.

5.1.5.3 *Provide deployees with sufficient resources to undertake their work?*

Generally, a high degree of flexibility was noted on the part of deployees. In terms of initial and ongoing difficulties faced by deployees, some expressed particular frustration at not having brought their own laptops (with software) as they had been led to believe that the necessary equipment would be provided. The review team recommends that **clarity around the provision of equipment and software form part of the preparatory conversation between the deployee and their prospective line manager prior to deployment.** While recognizing the additional pressures and stresses that are placed on UN agencies in the initial stages of an emergency the review team recommends that requesting agencies look to **systematize the setup of email as an integral part of their recruitment processes.** The review team questions whether the extent to which some of these difficulties are arising is due to the pressures faced by HR and administrative colleagues in country offices and the extent to which HR surge support is not possible. Here again, further consideration by donors and SBP deploying organisations' willingness to provide necessary generalist surge support is warranted.

5.1.5.4 Provide deployees with clear roles, responsibilities and supervision?

Feedback from many deployees highlight that there is a sense that many of the ToRs drafted were too generic and did not cover their roles adequately. Most deployees recognized that a certain degree of flexibility was required. However, it was apparent that some deployees' ToRs were totally unrepresentative in terms of what was actually being asked of them. It is also noted that several deployees consulted were taking on leadership roles without a great degree of supervision. Examples of SBP deployees being asked to supervise and run offices were also provided.

Rotation of UN staff, especially the transience of internal UN surge personnel as referenced earlier in the report, posed issues for some deployees. The rotation on shorter durations of internal surge staff in certain instances meant that newly arrived UN staff would constantly look to change practices and responsibilities of SBP deployees who in fact remain for a much longer duration. **Greater continuity and systemisation of practices and greater awareness and appreciation of SBP's 'longevity' in roles on the part of receiving UN agency staff may alleviate inefficiencies and SBP deployee frustration.** Due to the fast moving pace it was noted that *"time is sped up"* and in many instances Standby deployees have the 'historical' knowledge of response efforts.

The degree to which SBP deployees are being asked to be flexible, to take on leadership roles and to deal with continuously changing ways of working raised some questions regarding duty of care. Receiving UN agencies and deploying organisations should remain cognisant of the primacy of duty of care for deployees. The strengths that became evident through this AAR – the flexibility and commitment of deployees, the longer length of deployment compared to other surge, a willingness to live in remote areas – can push deployees to their limits, leading to burnout or other issues. These positive aspects of SBP support should continue to be secondary to overall duty of care.

Some deployees noted they were based in duty stations different to those originally referenced, were required to 'double hat' or were completely diverted from the role as set out in their ToR. Experiencing at least one of these major changes and finding the reality of the actual role and needs quite different to what they originally expected was relatively common. The review team also found that irrespective of the level (P3, P4) set out in the TORs, deployees commonly find themselves in leadership as opposed to support roles. Deployees on P3 contracts acting in what could be deemed P4 and P5 roles was not unusual. UN agencies and country offices should reflect on the extent to which deployees are expected to deviate from the roles, responsibilities and location set out in their ToR and whether this may have either duty of care or contractual implications.

"We still have some challenges with the SBP. For example, we have two team leaders that are SBP – they are team leaders and they're not supposed to manage staff. So there are some things that still need adjustment."

- Deputy Representative, UNICEF

"It's still not very clear who my line manager is. Am I reporting to the section? Reporting to the team leader? Still not very clear."

- SBP Deployee

5.2 IMPACT

The impact and sustainability of SBP support to the TC Idai response is largely dependent on how well the mechanism functions in the first place. With these operational aspects largely covered in section 5.1 of this report, attention turns to what the deployees were able to achieve once they were in place. A key question that the review team sought to answer was: *What are SBP deployments helping the UN to achieve in this context that would otherwise be difficult or more limited?* On this question, the review found that **SBP support was clearly central to the overall UN response**. Countless examples emerged during interviews that spoke to the individual and collective contribution of SBP deployees to UN operations in Mozambique – in many cases they were the sole representative of a particular function or sector in a particular location.

For example, interview respondents noted the criticality of SBP deployees in Education in Emergencies programming in the most affected areas, the CASH

Working Group, Protection programming, and mapping of the affected areas and the response itself. Most notable is the extent to which SBP deployees **led and continue to lead the clusters**, in many cases with the Portuguese language skills required to engage with the national government and local actors. This combination of language and cluster expertise was otherwise not available to the UN and without it the overall response would have been significantly more disjointed.

“For Cyclone Idai and Kenneth, we never could have done this operation without surge... and sustain it. We would have cracked.”

- Country Representative, UNFPA
Mozambique



NORCAP sexual and reproductive health specialist, Sabine Nana, preparing beds for women giving birth in a temporary health facility in a village outside Beira. NORCAP/Oda Lykke Mortensen.

5.2.1 CRITICAL GAPS THAT SBP DEPLOYEES ADDRESSED

Local and national-level knowledge (of natural disasters, of the affected communities, of the 'way things are done' in Mozambique) is certainly the most critical component of the response, followed by the development expertise already available in the country. SBP deployees, however, quickly complemented this existing capacity by bringing in **significant experience in emergency (and specifically cluster) coordination** from other large-scale, sudden onset humanitarian responses. This was found to be key to the effectiveness of the TC Idai response.

Indeed, the **influx of international humanitarian actors** to Mozambique across a range of sectors is precisely what made SBP support to the clusters and general emergency coordination so critical. As *quasi-outsiders*, SBP deployees were well placed to act as sectoral focal points for the UN, government, INGOs, and a range of local actors and implementing partners, particularly in Beira. This is due in large part to their experience but also because they deployed early in the first phase and tended to stay for at least three months; significantly longer than most other internal surge. One deployee in Beira described this aspect of SBP deployments in the following terms: *"[There was] a level of consistency and contextual understanding. Even three months of historical knowledge in an emergency is a lot. There's a different sense of time here, it's more sped up."*

The **contribution of SBP deployees to widespread emergency coordination gaps** was one of the most prevalent findings to emerge from this review. Secondary to this was the way in which SBP deployees filled critical gaps *across a range of sectors and skill profiles*, among them Cash, Child Protection, Communications, Education, Information Management, Information Technology, Logistics, Protection, Services for Communities (S4C) and WASH. Specific examples of these are described further in this section of the report.

SBP support should also be discussed in the context of what other (internal or external) expertise was available to UN agencies, if any. OCHA does not have a regular presence in Mozambique and some other agencies implement development programmes that are neither resourced nor mandated to respond to emergencies. Interviews with a number of UN agencies revealed that, despite being one of the most disaster prone countries in the world, some country offices do not have access to rapidly deployable emergency personnel internally. This underscores the reality that in some cases **surge via Standby was the only avenue for rapid emergency support**.

Interview respondents also consistently **acknowledged that the national government does not have access to external surge**, and government staff at national, provincial and local levels were often described by UN representatives and deployees as exhausted, in some cases nearing burn-out. With this in mind, coupled with the recognition that engaging with government is essential, the capacity for SBP deployees to bring fresh expertise, energy and support to individuals within both the UN and government is an important aspect of the overall SBP contribution. This was relevant for the first and second phases of the response but will remain so as the emergency transitions into early recovery.

ON THE SBP CONTRIBUTION TO COORDINATION:

"The Standby Partner [deployees] have been instrumental in getting cluster partners mobilised. Their prior knowledge of cluster operations has meant they can run coordination structures at the sub-national level on their own."

-Head of Office, UNICEF Beira

"We're UNICEF but not. It's a fine line but you cannot underestimate the value of that line for the clusters."

- SBP Deployee (Cluster Coordination)

"It was challenging with all the turnover. For cluster coordinators... the UN had two week rotations. We often had to start all over again."

- SBP Deployee, CashCap, deployed to HCT via WFP.

ON LIMITED UN ACCESS TO OTHER SURGE:

"We did not understand that UNFPA does not have a rapid response internal team ready to go... we were caught off guard. The Country Representative should not be drafting a ToR at the time of the emergency."

- Country Representative, UNFPA Mozambique

"UNICEF Mozambique resources were completely overwhelmed and over-stretched. Not many existing staff had experience in emergencies. UNICEF have only one Education in Emergencies Officer. Without the SBP deployees, they could not have coped as a Cluster Coordinator as well."

- Deputy Representative, UNICEF Mozambique

5.2.2 COLLECTIVE IMPACT OF SBP SUPPORT

The impact of Standby support in Mozambique is referred to throughout this report, however on this specific question interview respondents routinely commented on “the particular mix of skills, experience and mindset” (UNICEF Deputy Representative) that deployees brought to the response. On the whole, the SBP mechanism provided the *right people* – people with a critical mix of technical skills, emergency experience, relevant language skills, and interpersonal and cultural competencies (i.e.: ‘soft skills’). Once the deployees were in place, UN staff commented on the sense of complementarity that emerged whereby **existing staff capacity (local knowledge, development expertise,**

depth) merged with emergency response capacity (coordination, specific technical profiles, speed). As a result, interview respondents felt that SBP support clearly contributed to a quicker, more coordinated response and more inclusive programming.

The **regional and global nature of the SBP** was also a significant strength. Examples from this response emerged of deployees bringing knowledge of similar disasters, for example an EiE Expert from the Philippines who brought many years’ experience of cyclones and typhoons, and SBP deployees from other parts of Southern Africa who similarly brought contextually relevant experience. Interview respondents pointed to these deployees as having attributes that are a valuable ‘point of difference’.

ON THE COLLECTIVE IMPACT OF SBP DEPLOYMENTS:

“They arrive and start working at a completely different pace. They are fast, they get things moving. That can be difficult for country office staff at first, but I’ve seen it work well here. There is a respect for both sides, an acknowledgement that each of us brings something to the response.”

- IOM representative

“The impact is the speed with which people can deploy and the mindset they bring. The Standby deployees here are linking partners and maintaining contact with the government - that’s critical.”

- SBP Deployee, Beira

“The value of Standby partners is a combination of professionalism not just in terms of technical skills but how quickly you build a team. This is the real value that deployees bring - knowing when to do things on your own, and when you need the team. We see the gaps, thinking “where can we connect people, where can we put things together?”

- SBP Deployee, Maputo

ON THE RELATIVE LONGEVITY OF SBP DEPLOYMENTS:

“I don’t think there’s anyone else here that has stayed for three months. Everyone is really short term. So for Standby it’s the longevity, the consistency. The emergency really shifted with the resettlement activities and having been here for a longer period of time was really important.”

- SBP Deployee, Beira

“The duration of Standby support allows for huge improvements to continuity that would otherwise be weakened by rolling internal short missions.”

- Head of Office, UNICEF Beira

Worthy of particular note, the review found that SBP deployees made a strong contribution to **mapping of the affected areas (and mapping of the response)** in a range of ways, across a range of sectors. One Education in Emergencies deployee with UNICEF was responsible for identifying that a number of schools in the affected communities were missing from the formal school mapping data and thus not receiving any humanitarian assistance. These schools were located in the most hard to reach areas and, as a direct consequence of the deployee's work, were subsequently added to the formal list. UNICEF and other partners were then in a position to directly support these schools.

In another example, a WASH Cluster Coordinator worked closely alongside a fellow Standby deployee (WASH Cluster Information Management Officer) to improve the emergency mapping for a vast swathe of Northern Mozambique, a capability which could then be utilised for other sectors:

"I'm a bit of a map geek and this emergency has not had very good mapping. So I've been torturing [fellow SBP deployee; WASH IM] and the national regulators to have more granularity in the mapping. We put together a Google Maps for a huge area that allows us to not only figure out where everything is but to now plot the resettlement sites in the mapping."

- SBP Deployee, Beira

Another SBP deployee in the UNICEF WASH team recounted a similar **contribution to information gathering**: *"When I got here, I knew the floods would be absolutely devastating but there was so little information. So I insisted to go out there and be the eyes in the field. I went on mission after mission to get out there and get the information back. I think that was one of the things that I contributed."* - SBP Deployee, WASH Technical. There were also frequent examples of SBP deployees' improving the **mapping of partners**, thereby increasing the accuracy and visibility of the response.

SBP PROTECTION OUTCOMES ON THE GROUND

When asked about her most significant contribution to date, one SBP deployee cited her role in getting protection into the UNDP-led Post Disaster Needs Assessment. The first draft did not adequately consider protection and she was able to influence the final plan. She relayed:

"I was told that the draft was finalised but protection was completely missing so I really had to push it. I spoke with the Protection Cluster Lead, I went through the draft and got entire paragraphs in there on child protection. New York accepted those inputs as the final plan. That was a hard fought battle but it was vital - and it will mean that protection funds are available."

- SBP Deployee, Maputo

Another tangible protection outcome:

"An example of Standby support on the ground is that I really pushed for single mothers to be able to register their babies. [After the cyclone hit] they weren't able to do it without a father or two witnesses present, even though the law says they can do it on their own. That was an important success."

- SBP Deployee, Beira

5.3 SUSTAINABILITY

The review found evidence that some SBP deployment outcomes are likely to be sustained, though this was not a prominent feature of the majority of SBP deployments in Mozambique. Sustainability largely depended on whether the agency deemed the role as an ongoing requirement. This is not uncommon for humanitarian surge, though some interview respondents did acknowledge that sustainability should be better factored into human resourcing for emergency response (and therefore deployment TORs). Coordination roles were least likely to continue after the first and second phases of the response, and as a result rarely featured elements of sustainability such as mentoring and handover to national staff, or future planning.

There were, however, some examples of agencies taking steps to ensure the sustainability of deployees' work in preparation for their departure and in future planning for specific positions. In comparison to other surge, the longer duration of SBP deployments (generally three up to six months) also led to better sustainability of outcomes. This ensured time for new processes or systems to be embedded and/or for deployees to develop strong relationships with other emergency actors working on the response. Some examples from interview respondents that demonstrate sustainability in some way are outlined below:

"I'm working directly alongside a national staff member and I'll be handing over to him when I leave. He's extremely capable, although it's fair to say he's exhausted. Let's not forget that."

- SBP Deployee, Beira

"The biggest impact of having the SBP support is the shadowing with country office staff. That sets us up for the future. Everyone in the office was open to receive as much information as possible and asking questions. There was no sense of 'This is how I've been doing things here'. For the whole UNICEF team there was always this... openness. They knew they needed support. Standby deployees were also very open about what they didn't know about the Mozambique context. So it was a real exchange."

- Chief of WASH, UNICEF

"In Beira, I paired the Standby staff with somebody from my (Maputo) team for a week or two. Relationships with government and local partners are critical, so for me what worked was the Standby having the emergency skills combined with the local staff having the Mozambique context, the system, everything. And then approaching the government and partners together. That worked beautifully."

- Chief of Child Protection, UNICEF

"When national staff were leading on reporting and coordination, I followed up with so many questions - what child protection issues did you observe, what happened to the families who were left behind, have their children been found. I was pushing them to think about implications rather than simply outputs. And now every report is much better than the last."

- SBP Deployee, Maputo



Community members affected by Cyclone Idai at a resettlement site in Dondo, Mozambique.
RedR Australia/Kylie Harrington.

6.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS



Community members affected by Tropical Cyclone Idai gather at a women-friendly space in Dondo, near Beira, Mozambique. UNFPA/Natalia da Luz.

Based on the achievements and challenges identified, as well as the analysis of the underlying issues and factors of success, the AAR team have articulated a number of conclusions and recommendations to improve future SBP emergency response. The recommendations presented here could be translated into a subsequent action plan to ensure follow-up is taken.

6.1 CONCLUSIONS;

- i. It is acknowledged that deployment of the right person to a particular role in response to TC Idai was very much constrained by the required language skills. Nonetheless, on the whole, the review found that **the SBP mechanism provided the right people** – people with a critical mix of technical skills, emergency experience, relevant language skills, and interpersonal and cultural competencies. Feedback from UN agencies regarding deployees was resoundingly positive.
- ii. **Rapid scale up:** All of the UN agencies consulted lacked the appropriate emergency personnel to enable them to scale up their response to the required levels. Most notable is the extent to which SBP deployees occupied team leader positions and led the clusters, in many cases with the Portuguese language skills required to engage with the national government.
- iii. **Reach:** Support offered via the Standby Partnership was instrumental in UN agencies scaling up their reach into areas of Mozambique that would otherwise not have been served. Furthermore, SBP deployees were critical in identifying where needs were most urgent and where UN agencies should focus on extending their reach.
- iv. **Criticality:** Support offered via the Standby Partnership was critical to the UN response in Mozambique. SBP deployees filled crucial coordination positions and in some cases led entire emergency programmes (where that capacity was not already existing in the country - for example, Education in Emergencies).
- v. **Longevity:** The vast majority of UN agency surge capacity was short term in nature, typically in the region of two week rotations. Conversely, SBP deployees were generally deployed for either three or six months. As such, SBP deployees' relative 'longevity' in roles meant that in many instances SBP deployees held the historical knowledge of response efforts. In this sense SBP were both central to the response but were also influential in terms of sustained presence and moving response initiatives forward.
- vi. **Skills:**
 - a. **Technical:** The SBP offered Specific technical expertise that was otherwise not available to or within UN agencies. In this response, in certain sectoral and cross cutting areas, UN agencies lacked specific technical skills within their existing surge capacity mechanisms. SBP deployees filled critical gaps across a range of sectors and skill profiles, among them Cash, Child Protection, Communications, Education, Information Management, Information Technology, Logistics, Protection, Services for Communities (S4C) and WASH amongst other sectoral areas.
 - b. **Language:** The Standby Partnership offered these agencies rapid access to experienced emergency personnel with Portuguese language skills. However, the number of available of Portuguese speakers with the relevant technical expertise available through the SBP was exhausted quickly. This became a major constraint with regard to the effectiveness of the overall response.
- vii. **Value of interpersonal and leadership skills:** This aspect is arguably the critical factor in the success or otherwise of emergency surge. It was not uncommon for the positive interpersonal attributes of SBP deployees to be given more weight than technical and language skills during the review. Deployees were variously described as good leaders and self-starters, operating with empathy, humility and commitment. This facilitated their acceptance by other actors and their effectiveness in their respective roles.

- viii. The cohort of SBP deployees in Mozambique was **culturally diverse** and brought a wealth of **emergency experience from other contexts**. SBP deployees quickly complemented existing capacity within UN agencies by bringing in emergency expertise (and specifically cluster coordination) from other large-scale, sudden onset humanitarian responses. This was found to be critical to the effectiveness of the TC Idai response.
- ix. The SBP offers UN agencies personnel with **different perspectives, different ways of working, new ways of thinking**. SBP deployees are not entrenched in one UN agency, which can lead to a greater willingness and/or awareness to challenge the status quo or suggest new ways of working.
- x. SBP deployees **consistently demonstrated a high degree of flexibility**. They were open to deviating from their TOR, were often called to 'double hat' (i.e: lead on both coordination and programming), take on additional duties and act in leadership roles where necessary.
- xi. The review found some evidence that **UN security briefings may not have been prioritised** and were not undertaken by all SBP deployees. It is critical that deployees attend a formal security briefing and are connected to UNDSS alerts.
- xii. **Bottlenecks to UN scale up:** The volume of emergency recruitments put significant strain on UN country office HR departments (which had limited access to any form of 'emergency HR surge'). This caused bottlenecks with getting people on the ground and inducted quickly. A number of UN agency country offices raised the possibility of the SBP supporting surge HR personnel or other generalist deployees to ensure that any potential bottlenecks related to administrative processing, recruitment formalities and other coordination tasks can be addressed.

6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS;

- i. Given how critical SBP support is to UN emergency operations, **increase marketing of the SBP** to donors (to generate support) and within the UN (to better utilise the mechanism).
- ii. Requesting agencies should consider in more detail and better **specify how critical language skills are** to the role, as set out in the SBP Deployment Terms of Reference.
- iii. SBP deploying organisations should reflect on their willingness to **deploy generalist surge profiles** to UN country offices during the **critical first days of an emergency**. The deployment of generalist/ coordination deployees (HAO or similar) who are familiar with the SBP and who can lead on coordination efforts at the country level help to mitigate bottlenecks with getting surge personnel on the ground and orientated as quickly as possible.
- iv. In the first days of the emergency, SBP partners (requesting UN agencies, affected country office HR departments, and SBP deploying organisations) should endeavour to **convene a Webex or similar coordination call** to discuss available personnel versus requesting UN agencies' surge needs. This would assist as a sort of prioritisation exercise and may reduce the element of 'competition' between requesting agencies, ensuring deployees are placed with agencies on the basis of critical need. For TC Idai, there were instances of deployees with the critical technical and language skills supporting one or two agencies only (e.g. Portuguese speaking IMO's in two agencies). The current practice does not lend itself to maximising SBP impact.
- v. UN agencies should be more frank in their **evaluation of deployees' performance** and SBP roster agencies should be willing to de-roster people who are consistently not performing, particularly with regard to interpersonal 'soft' skills.
- vi. **Pre-departure contact** (e.g. Skype call) between the person deploying and the country office should be considered mandatory. The review found that contact prior to arrival sets expectations and flags any inconsistencies in understanding of the deployment for both parties. There were instances in Mozambique where this contact did not occur, resulting in mismatched expectations or missing critical information.

- vii. This AAR highlighted the importance of both technical and soft skills. Many SBP deployees undertake **UN trainings** (with support via the SBP Training Secretariat). Given that soft skills are easily observed in an interactive training setting, SBP deploying and receiving agencies could find ways to formalise or enhance feedback channels relating to roster members' performance during trainings for the purpose of informing nominations.
- viii. SBPs should ensure greater clarity around the provision of physical equipment and software as part of the preparatory conversation between the deployee and their prospective line manager prior to deployment. The review team also recommends that requesting agencies look to prioritise email setup as an integral part of their on-boarding processes.
- ix. Deploying organisations and receiving UN agencies should reaffirm their commitment to deployees receiving a **full and meaningful security briefing** on arrival. Deployees should also be pro-active and ensure they are receiving regular updates from UNDSS. Several deployees in Mozambique stated that they had not yet received a UNDSS (or agency) security briefing. Deployee duty of care notwithstanding, not engaging in a security briefing can have flow-on implications for insurance and can also mean that deployees will not receive TRIP Clearance.
- x. The TC Idai response, alongside recent crises in Venezuela and Angola, has identified a need for SBP deploying organisations to **actively recruit more Spanish and Portuguese speakers**.
- xi. Given the language shortfalls and communications barriers that came to light during this review, a number of review participants raised the possibility of the SBP engaging in partnership with **Translators Without Borders**.
- xii. Requesting UN agencies and country offices should reflect on the extent to which deployees are expected to deviate from the roles, responsibilities and location set out in their TOR. **Significant deviation from agreed conditions** can have contractual or duty of care implications, and should be agreed with both the deployee and the SBP deploying organization.
- xiii. Deploying organisations remain cognisant of the importance of **interpersonal, communications and leadership skills** when they undertake recruitment rounds. The review found that emotional intelligence, the ability to lead and have empathy was more important than having the necessary technical expertise.
- xiv. Some SBP agencies have previously engaged in circulating general **"get ready"** calls to SBP deploying organisations in advance of a predicted, imminent emergency. These calls can allow deployees and deploying organisations critical time to ready themselves before more specific details and requirements are available.
- xv. Receiving UN agencies and deploying organisations should remain cognisant of the **primacy of deployee duty of care**. The strengths that became evident through this AAR – the flexibility and commitment of deployees, the longer length of deployment compared to other surge, a willingness to live and work in remote areas – can push deployees to their limits, leading to burnout or other issues. These positive aspects of SBP support should continue to be secondary to overall duty of care.

7. ANNEXES



Flooding in parts of Nsanje District, Malawi, following Tropical Cyclone Idai, 18 March 2019. UNICEF/Juskauskas, Kunje & Chipukunya.

ANNEX 1: TERMS OF REFERENCE

After Action Review – Tropical Cyclone Idai Response (June 2019)

1. HUMANITARIAN CONTEXT:

Tropical Cyclone (TC) Idai made landfall during the night of 14 to 15 March 2019 near Beira City, Sofala Province, in central Mozambique. The cyclone brought torrential rains and winds to Sofala, Zambezia, Manica and Inhambane provinces. The UN and humanitarian partners in Mozambique appealed for US\$40.8 million to provide critical emergency relief to 400,000 people who were estimated to be affected by Tropical Cyclone Idai, based on projections of people living in the Cyclone's path (OCHA, 15 Mar 2019).

2. THE STANDBY PARTNERSHIP (SBP)

The SBP is a network of bilateral agreements between organisations and United Nations (UN) agencies. The partnership emerged in response to the increasing prevalence of global humanitarian crises which required the UN to rapidly expand its human resource capability at short notice. The SBP comprises a range of partners which provide support via the deployment of gratis personnel. Each Standby Partner maintains its own roster of humanitarian experts who are called upon to fill staffing needs in UN operations. The collaboration between UN agencies and partners is an integral component of any rapid response mechanism.

3. SBP AFTER ACTION REVIEW (AAR; PILOT)

Whilst not wholly standardised, Standby arrangements operate similarly across UN agencies and Standby Partners and to a large extent the challenges, lessons learned and opportunities are therefore often the same. The SBP has determined that, where the activities and objectives of SBP partners align for a particular humanitarian response, joint field monitoring missions may add value to both individual agencies and the broader partnership. Perhaps most critically, joint missions minimise the burden on country offices of hosting and/or supporting concurrent missions by SBPs.

Following the humanitarian response to TC Idai in Southern Africa, a range of Standby Partners have agreed to pilot a joint mission focused solely on Mozambique. Individual agencies may conduct separate monitoring in other affected countries (Malawi; Zimbabwe). The key objectives of this Joint SBP AAR are outlined below.

4. PARTICIPATING AGENCIES:

Field participation: Representatives from UNICEF, NRC, RedR Australia, Irish Aid, DFID.

Broader TC Idai AAR participation: FAO, WFP, UNFPA, OCHA.

UNICEF has agreed to support this mission by providing in-country logistical assistance and access to key personnel in Mozambique. UN agencies that are not participating in the field component have agreed to facilitate support via their country offices for this mission, where relevant. The review team intends to minimise disruption to country offices and their ongoing operations.

5. PILOT AAR OBJECTIVES:

The objective of this AAR is to monitor SBP contributions to UN operations that are responding to TC Idai in Mozambique (Maputo and Beira). The AAR broadly seeks to identify the extent to which the SBP has enhanced the capacity of UN operations in the field and to determine how the response mechanism could be improved. The review has two key areas of focus:

Part A: Operational aspects

Part B: Impact and sustainability

6. REVIEW QUESTIONS:

PART A: Operational aspects

1. Why was the SBP deployment necessary in the first place?
2. If essential to the operation, what steps did the UN agency take to fill the role internally (if any) or at the end of the SBP deployment? What steps have been taken to fill the role with national staff?
3. To what extent has the SBP been able to deploy the right person? (incl. range of professional competencies: technical skills, interpersonal skills, communication, commitment, language skills)
4. To what extent has the SBP been able to deploy people quickly? How timely has the SBP response been? What have been the bottlenecks to getting people on the ground quickly?
5. To what extent did the host agency (at country or field level):
 - a) Provide adequate introduction and orientation to the deployee?
 - b) Provide the deployee with a full security briefing?
 - c) Provide the deployee with sufficient resources to undertake their work (administration support, physical resources)?
 - d) Provide the deployee with clear roles and responsibilities and supervision?

6. To what extent was the deployee:
 - a) Adequately briefed and prepared for the deployment (incl. fully briefed on security)?
 - b) Able to integrate quickly into the operating context ('hit the ground running')?
 - c) Able to overcome impediments to carrying out their role effectively?

PART B: Impact and sustainability

Key question: What is the SBP helping the UN to achieve in this context that would otherwise be difficult or more limited? The following three sections have been adapted from the UNSBP PER template.

1. **Impact:** What critical gaps have been (or are being) addressed by the SBP? To what extent have SBP deployments to the TC Idai response strengthened UN operations? (E.g. through transfer of skills, new initiatives, innovation, set-up of new systems, coordination, etc).
2. **Sustainability:** How are host organisations ensuring that the deployees' contribution is sustained? (E.g. institutionalisation of new practices, handover, replacement).
3. **Effect on the situation on the ground/persons of concern, if relevant:** How have SBP deployments provided relief or assistance to affected populations?

Sub-questions for Part B:

- a) **Gender, Protection & Inclusion:** At what stage of the response were specific positions in this skill profile filled? To what extent are UN agencies finding it difficult to fill Gender/GBV/Inclusion roles? What evidence is there of SBP deployees mainstreaming gender, protection and inclusion through the operations?
- b) **Localisation:** How cognisant are SBP deployees of the localisation agenda? Is this something that needs more emphasis and training? How have SBP deployees contributed to strengthening national and local leadership in humanitarian action? (E.g. by reinforcing local decision-making making, inclusion of local NGOs in coordination, increasing diversity of local actors, other?).
- c) **Accountability to Affected Populations / Communication with Communities:** How are (or are) SBP deployees building capacity in these specific areas? How are they contributing to accountability to affected populations in the overall response?

7. EXPECTED OUTPUTS:

1. Key findings and operational recommendations (full report)
2. Key findings and operational recommendations (summary overview)
3. Guidance note for future SBP AARs, based on lessons learned from this mission (internal)

8. KEY DOCUMENTS:

1. SBP AAR Agenda
2. List of TC Idai deployees per SBP partner, UN agency, profile and country/duty station.

ANNEX 2: AAR INTERVIEW LIST

Final Interview List - SBP After Action Review Cyclone Idai (June 2019)

Interview No.	Interview Date	Interview Respondent	Organisation	Position Title	Interview Type	Country / City
1	Tues 18 June	Michel Le Pechoux	UNICEF	Deputy Representative	1. Management	Moz (Maputo)
2	Tues 18 June	Edith Morch-Binnema	UNICEF	Chief of Child Protection	2. Supervisor / HR / Section	Moz (Maputo)
3	Tues 18 June	Jesus Trelles	UNICEF	WASH Specialist (OIC Chief of WASH)	2. Supervisor / HR / Section	Moz (Maputo)
4	Tues 18 June	Leilani Elliot	UNICEF (DRC)	Child Protection Sub-Cluster Coordinator	3. Deployee	Moz (Maputo)
5	Tues 18 June	Carolina Verissimo; Penina Adongo	UNICEF	HR Specialist; HR Specialist	2. Supervisor / HR / Section	Moz (Maputo)
6	Tues 18 June	Karin Manente	WFP	Country Director	1. Management	Moz (Maputo)
7	Tues 18 June	Pastor Lovo	WFP	IT Specialist	2. Supervisor / HR / Section	Moz (Maputo)
8	Tues 18 June	Rita Nunes	WFP	HR Specialist	2. Supervisor / HR / Section	Moz (Maputo)
9	Tues 18 June	Robert Smith	OCHA	Head of Office	1. Management	Moz (Maputo)
10	Wed 19 June	Corrina Kriedler; Venetia Ellers	DFID Moz	Humanitarian Response Manager; Humanitarian Advisor	1. Management	Moz (Maputo)
11	Wed 19 June	Pronch Murray	Irish Aid	Development Specialist	1. Management	Moz (Maputo)
12	Wed 19 June	Sarla Varma	UNICEF (NORCAP)	WASH Emergency Technical Specialist	3. Deployee	Moz (Maputo)
13	Wed 19 June	Penelope Muteteli	UNDP	Senior Protection Advisor (ProCap)	3. Deployee	Moz (Maputo)
14	Wed 19 June	Atta Ur Rehman	WHO (NORCAP)	Monitoring & Evaluation Officer	3. Deployee	Moz (Maputo)
15	Wed 19 June	Camille Baudot; Kenji Ohira; Massimo Lucania	UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF (CANADEM)	Chief of Education; Education Specialist; Emergency Specialist (TL; CANADEM)	2. Supervisor / HR / Section	Moz (Maputo)
18	Thurs 20 June	Andrea Wojnar	UNFPA	Resident Representative	1. Management	Moz (Maputo)
19	Thurs 20 June	Ricardo Lobo	WFP (CashCap)	Cash Based Transfers Expert	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
20	Fri 21 June	Stancelous Mverecheda	WHO (NORCAP)	IM Specialist	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
21	Fri 21 June	Grace Chirewa; Felicite Molengar; Sabine Nana; Bakary Diarra	UNFPA (NORCAP)	Protecion/GBV Cluster Coordinator; GBV Programme Specialist; Humanitarian SRH Programme Specialist Logistics Expert	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
22	Fri 21 June	Dermot Carty	UNICEF	Team Leader / Head of Field Office	1. Management	Moz (Beira)
23	Fri 21 June	Annaliza Laylo	UNICEF (RedR)	Education in Emergencies Specialist	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
24	Fri 21 June	Herbert Bos	UNICEF (DSS Water)	WASH Emergency Technical Specialist	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
25	Fri 21 June	Teresa McArdle	UNICEF (CANADEM)	CPIE Coordination Specialist	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
26	Fri 21 June	Juan Luis Lopez	UNICEF (RRT - ACF)	WASH Cluster Coordinator	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
27	Fri 21 June	Jason Searle	UNICEF (RRT - iMMAP)	WASH Cluster IMO	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
28	Fri 21 June	Prabhu Govindaraj	FAO (CANADEM)	Logistician	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira)
29	Fri 21 June	Sean Casey	WHO	Health Cluster Coordinator/Incident mgr	2. Supervisor	Moz (Beira)
30	Fri 21 June	Diana Restrepo-Mejia	UNFPA	SRH Technical Specialist	2. Supervisor	
31	Sat 22 June	Jeremiah O'Sullivan	IOM (RedR)	Shelter Expert	3. Deployee	Moz (Beira/ Pemba)
32	Wed 26 June	Gemma Connell	OCHA ROSEA (Nairobi)	Head of Region	1. Management	Kenya (Skype)

ANNEX 3: SBP SUPPORT TO TROPICAL CYCLONE IDAI: DEPLOYING AGENCIES AND MAJOR DONORS

Deploying Agencies:

- Action Contre La Faim
- CANADEM
- Danish Refugee Council
- DSS Water (Dutch Support Service)
- Emergency.Lu
- Ericsson Response
- Iceland Crisis Response Unit (ICRU)
- International Medical Corps
- iMMAPP
- Irish Aid
- MSB (Sweden)
- NORCAP
- Norwegian Church Aid
- RedR Australia

MAJOR DONORS*:

- Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
- Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (DEMA)
- Global Affairs Canada
- Government of Iceland
- Government of Luxembourg
- Government of the Netherlands
- Irish Aid - Irish Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA)
- Swiss Development Corporation (SDC)
- The Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA)
- UK Department for International Development (DFID)
- Various other donors

*The review team acknowledges that some deploying agencies also received support from other donors not listed above. Unfortunately, it was not possible to ascertain a complete list within the confines of the timeframe for the review.

ANNEX 4: LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAR	After Action Review
ACF	Action Contre La Faim
CashCap	Cash and Markets Standby Capacity Project
DSS Water	Dutch Surge Support Water
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
GenCap	Gender Standby Capacity Project
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HQ	Headquarters
HR	Human Resources
IMC	International Medical Corps
IMO	Information Management Officer
MSB	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency
NCA	Norwegian Church Aid
OPT	Occupied Palestinian Territory
ProCap	Protection Standby Capacity Project
PSEA	Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SBP	Standby Partnership
SDC	Swiss Development Cooperation
TC	Tropical Cyclone
ToR	Terms of Reference
UK DfID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
UN	United Nations
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (Office of)
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WG	Working Group

